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THE NEW WITGENSTEINIANS AND THE
END OF JURISPRUDENCE
George A. Martinez*
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of scholars have recently proposed an approach to
jurisprudence and a method of justification in law, which is inspired
in large part by the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein.'
Traditional theories of legal justification have sought to explain what
it means to say propositions in law are true.2 For example, Ronald
Dworkin has argued that propositions of law are true if they follow
from the principles of justice and fairness that provide the best
constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice.' Thus,
for Dworkin, the truth of a legal proposition depends on something
external to law as it is usually understood-principles of justice and
fairness.4 Propositions of law are true because they stand in a certain
relationship to political theory.' Thus, more generally, the traditional
picture of legal justification is that the truth of a legal proposition is
a function of something that goes beyond specifically legal justifi-
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Arizona State University; M.A. Philosophy, 1979, The University of Michigan; J.D., 1985,
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Professors Dennis Patterson of Rutgers
University School of Law (Camden) and Joseph Mendola of the University of Nebraska
Department of Philosophy for reviewing and commenting on a draft of this Article. I also
would like to thank Professors Marc Steinberg, Elizabeth Thornburg, and Harvey Wingo
for their comments. Cynthia Daley provided research assistance. Finally, I would like to
thank Dean C. Paul Rogers, III, Southern Methodist University and the Alfred McLane
Endowment for providing a summer research grant to support this project.
1. See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); Dennis
Patterson, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 270 (1993) (reviewing
PHILIP BOBBIT-r, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)). For other scholars who
advocate a Wittgensteinian approach to legal philosophy, see WITGENSTEIN AND LEGAL
THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992); Douglas Lind, Constitutional Adjudication as a
Craft-Bound Excellence, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 353 (1994).
2. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 279.
3. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE].
4. Patterson, supra note 1, at 279.
5. Id.
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cation-for example, appeals to precedents or the language of a
statute.6 For instance, according to Dworkin, without political theory
it would be impossible to identify true legal propositions.
According to the new Wittgensteinians, the traditional method of
legal justification is related to a wider debate in philosophy-the
debate between realists and antirealists8 These terms refer to
different theories about how one determines the truth of a legal
proposition.' According to realists, a proposition is made true by
virtue of some feature of the world that makes it true.1" On the
other hand, antirealists contend that there are no features of the
world that make propositions true." According to antirealists, the
only measure of the truth of a proposition is by reference to the sort
of evidence we conventionally regard as determinative. 2 Traditional
6. lId at 281; see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent
Rationality of Law, 97 YALE Li. 949 (1988). Weinrib observes that the dominant
tendency is to look upon the content of law from the standpoint of some external ideals
that the law is to enforce. See Weinrib, supra at 955. He contends that implicit in
contemporary legal scholarship is the idea that law embodies or should embody some goal
that can be specified apart from law and can serve as the standard by which law is to be
evaluated. Id.
7. Patterson, supra note 1, at 282.
8. Id at 284. For more on realism versus antirealism, see MICHAEL DEVITT,
REALISM AND TRUTH (2d ed. 1991); HILARY PUTNAM, REALISM AND REASON (1983);
RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM AND TRUTH (1991) [hereinafter RoRTY,
OBJECTIVrr]Y.
9. Patterson, supra note 1, at 284.
10. See id; see also MICHAEL DUMMETT, TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS (1978).
Dummett characterizes "realism" as the belief that statements-for example, statements
about the physical world or mental events-possess an objective truth value, independently
of our means of knowing it. DUMMETr, supra, at 146. Such statements are true or false
in virtue of a reality existing independently of us. Id
11. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 284.
12. See id; see also DUMMETr, supra note 10, at 146. In contrast to realism, the
antirealist contends that statements are to be understood only by reference to the sort of
thing which we count as evidence for such a statement. DUMMETr, supra note 10. The
realist, on the other hand, takes the position that the meanings of statements are not
directly tied to the kind of evidence for them that we can have, but consist in the manner
of their determination as true or false by states of affairs whose existence is not dependent
on our possession of evidence for them. Id. The antirealist, however, argues that the
meanings of statements are tied directly to what we count as evidence for them such that
a statement, if true at all, can be true only in virtue of something of which we could know
and which we should count as evidence for its truth. It; see also RORTY, OBJEcTIVITY,
supra note 8. "The term 'antirealism' was first put in circulation by Michael Dummett
.... " RORTY, OBJECTIVITY. supra note 8, at 3.
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legal theorists, then, offer a causal theory of legal justification-a legal
proposition is true because something external to law makes it true. 3
The new Wittgensteinians suggest that theorists turn away from
this causal or external theory of justification. 4 They suggest that a
proposition of law is true if one can show that on any particular
occasion one is correctly using the words in question.' 5 This means
that jurisprudence is to be concerned with the internal description of
law's public practices of justification-that is, the strategies or
modalities that lawyers use to demonstrate the truth of a proposi-
tion. 6
This Article seeks to critically evaluate the new approach to
jurisprudence and legal justification. In particular, one of the most
significant contributions of the Article is that it seeks to evaluate the
new approach by, among other things, examining the history of the
Wittgensteinian descriptive project in other areas of philosophy. The
Article focuses primarily on the work of Philip Bobbitt who has
offered the leading example of this type of neo-Wittgensteinian
approach. 7 The arguments generated in the course of the Article,
however, may be applied against any neo-Wittgensteinian
internalist' approach to jurisprudence. Thus, the Article seeks to
provide a general critique of the neo-Wittgensteinian internalist
project in law.
Part II sets out a brief account of Wittgenstein's later approach
to philosophy. It also explains that Wittgenstein influenced philoso-
phers to take the linguistic turn. Thus, it describes the approaches of
the ideal language philosophers and the ordinary language philoso-
phers. Part II then locates Bobbitt's project within the Wittgen-
steinian tradition and sets out Bobbitt's basic descriptive approach to
13. Patterson, supra note 1, at 288.
14. Id. at 289.
15. I&
16. Id.; see Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the
Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1, 56 (1993) [hereinafter Patterson,
Poverty]:
The task of jurisprudence is the accurate description of the forms of
argument used by lawyers to show the truth of propositions of law. Jurispru-
dence should turn its attention away from the fixation on interpretation and
study the ways in which lawyers go about the task of justifying propositions of
law.
17. See BOBBIrr, supra note 1.
18. For more on the distinction between intemalist and externalist approaches in
jurisprudence, see infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
January 1996]
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jurisprudence. Part II closes by contrasting internal with external
approaches to jurisprudence. Part III sets out some alternatives to
the internalist descriptive project. Part IV seeks to evaluate the neo-
Wittgensteinian internalist descriptive approach to jurisprudence. The
Article concludes that the neo-Wittgensteinian project should be
rejected.
II. THE NEW WITTGENSTEINIANS: THE EXAMPLE OF PHILIP
BOBBITT
Philip Bobbitt has provided the best example of the new
Wittgensteinian project.19 Thus, in order to evaluate this new
approach to jurisprudence and legal justification, this Article focuses
primarily on the views of Bobbitt. To understand and evaluate the
neo-Wittgensteinian project, however, it is necessary to understand
Wittgenstein's later approach to philosophy and subsequent
philosophical developments that were heavily influenced by
Wittgenstein.
A. Wittgenstein's Method
According to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, philosophical
problems are not genuine problems.' They represent nothing to be
solved.2 Wittgenstein's goal was to make philosophical problems
disappear so that we can stop doing philosophy altogether.22
According to Wittgenstein, the purpose of philosophy is to
provide us with a surview or synoptic view.' In his view, the
misunderstandings characteristic of philosophy arise out of the
difficulty of surveying our use of language.24 The reason for giving
a surview is to dispel philosophical illusion.' Wittgenstein sought to
cure philosophers of the diseases of the understanding.26 According-
19. See BoBBrrT, supra note 1. For reviews of Bobbitt's CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION, see T.R.S. Allan, Constitutional Interpretation, 52 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 157
(1993); Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1993); Patterson,
supra note 1; Book Note, Legitimacy and Justice in Constitutional Interpretation, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1218 (1993).
20. ROBERT J. FOGELIN, WITrGENSTEIN 142 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 1987).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 143.
23. P.M.S. HACKER, INSIGHT AND ILLUSION 113 (1972).
24. Id at 114.
25, ld. at 115.
26. Id. at 116.
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ly, his principal view of the purpose of philosophy is to eliminate
confusion and to cause the disappearance of philosophical prob-
lems.27 In particular, the task of philosophy is to dissolve philosophi-
cal difficulties that arise out of language.O
In Wittgenstein's view, philosophical problems arise when
philosophers misuse language.29 Thus, Wittgenstein sought to
provide a description of our ordinary uses of language." In
Wittgenstein's view, philosophy could not interfere with the actual use
of language.31 Philosophy can only describe the actual use of
language?2 Thus, philosophy "leaves everything as it is."33
For Wittgenstein, explanations had to come to an end
somewhere 4 Philosophers have made an error by seeking more
explanation than the subject matter will allow?5 Thus, philosophers
must stop seeking to justify answers. The only thing for philosophers
to do is simply describe our current practice. Wittgenstein writes,
"[w]e must do away with all explanation, and description alone must
take its place."36 Wittgenstein, then, took the position that philoso-
phy was purely descriptive.37 Philosophy is a conceptual investiga-
tion-it describes our conceptual structures.38
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. STANLEY CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON: WITrGENSTEIN, SKEPTICISM,
MORALITY AND TRAGEDY 226 (1979); see C.S. Chihara & J.A. Fodor, Operationalism and
Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein, in WITrGENSTEiN: THE PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS 384, 387-88 (George Pitcher ed., 1966).
30. See HACKER, supra note 23, at 151-52.
31. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 124, at 49
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
32. See id.
33. Id.; see also A.M. Quinton, Excerpt from "Contemporary British Philosophy", in
WITIGENSTEIN: THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 13 (George Pitcher ed., 1966).
Quinton observes that Wittgenstein concluded that it is no part of the business of
philosophy to reform language. Quinton, supra, at 15. Philosophy must leave everything
as it is. Id.
34. See HACKER, supra note 23, at 150.
35. Id. at 150; see PAUL JOHNSTON, WITrGENSTEIN AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1989).
Johnston observes that one general source of confusion against which Wittgenstein argues
is the temptation to seek explanation where this is no longer appropriate. JOHNSTON,
supra, at 12.
36. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 31, para. 109, at 47.
37. See HACKER, supra note 23, at 117.
38. Id.
January 1996]
550 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In Wittgenstein's view, the invention of new theories could
contribute nothing to the solution of philosophical problems.3 9
Philosophy only describes.4" Philosophy is concerned with examining
the concepts we have, not those we do not have.4' Thus, philosophy
is purely descriptive and it lacks a stratified structure of theory.4
B. Linguistic Philosophy
In the wake of Wittgenstein, philosophers took the "Linguistic
Turn."'43 According to the linguistic philosophers, philosophical
problems are problems which may be solved or dissolved either by
reforming language or by understanding more about ordinary
language.' In philosophy, two opposing schools developed: ideal
language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy. 5 Some
knowledge about these schools is important because the ideal
language philosophers rejected the Wittgensteinian descriptivist
approach of the ordinary language philosophers.
1. Ideal language philosophy
The philosopher Gustav Bergmann suggested that it would be
possible to eliminate philosophical problems not by describing our
ordinary language but by constructing an ideal language.46 Accord-
ing to Bergmann, ordinary language is "unperspicuous" in that it
39. kd. at 118; see also JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 2. Johnston observes that the
fundamental premise underlying Wittgenstein's method is the claim that philosophy should
be descriptive, and that it should advance no theses. JOHNSTON, supra note 35, at 2. The
philosopher is not called upon to discover truth nor to offer explanations. Id. Rather the
philosopher's job is to eliminate conceptual confusion by depicting the relations between
concepts. Id.
40. See HACKER, supra note 23, at 118.
41. Id. at 119.
42. Id.
43. See generally THE LINGUISTIC TURN: RECENT ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL
METHOD (Richard Rorty ed., 1967) [hereinafter LINGUISTIC TURN] (explaining movement
away from Wittgensteinian scientific evaluation of philosophical theories to more language
oriented approach).
44. ld. at 3; see also THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP (Paul A. Schilpp ed.,
1963) (observing that the aim of both naturalists and constructivists was to solve
philosophical problems); Gustav Bergmann, Logical Positivism, Language, and the
Reconstruction of Metaphysics, in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 63 (discussing group
of philosophers who have taken the linguistic turn initiated by Wittgenstein).
45. See Bergmann, supra note 44, at 64 (discussing division between ideal linguists and
analysts of ordinary usage); LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 4.
46. See Bergmann, supra note 44, at 63-64; LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 6.
[Vol. 29:545
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makes possible the formulation of philosophical questions.47 Thus,
to say that philosophical questions are questions of language is just to
say that these are questions which we ask only because we speak the
language we do.48 According to Bergmann, we do not have to speak
the language we do-unless we want to ask philosophical questions.49
Instead, an ideal language could be constructed. Thus, philosophical
problems could be dissolved by reforming our present language °
Such a language would be one in which philosophical propositions and
philosophical questions could not be asked.5 Under this view, the
history of philosophy may be viewed as suggestions about what an
ideal language would be like. 2 For Bergmann, philosophy becomes
linguistic recommendation. 3
2. Ordinary language philosophy
In contrast to the ideal language philosophers, a group of
philosophers developed-ordinary language philosophers-who,
following the later Wittgensteinians, took the linguistic turn but
refused to construct an ideal language.' They took the position that
philosophical problems arise not because English is unperspicuous,
but because philosophers have not used ordinary English." In their
47. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 6.
48. kL at 7.
49. Id
50. Bergmann, supra note 44, at 67-68. Bergmann states that, for a scheme to qualify
as an ideal language, it must fulfill two conditions. Id First, it must be complete in
accounting for all areas of experience. Id Second, it must permit the solution of all
philosophical problems. l
51. Bergmann, supra note 44, at 65 (observing that in an ideal language, the
philosophers' propositions could no longer be stated); LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43,
at 7.
52. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 7.
53. IL at 8; see Alice A. Lazerowitz, Linguistic Approaches to Philosophical Problems,
in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, 147. Lazerowitz observes that the ideal language
philosophers view philosophical theories as proposals to alter language. LINGUISTIC TURN,
supra note 43, at 8, 151.
54. J.0. Urmson, The History of Philosophical Analysis, in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra
note 43, at 294. Urmson observes that the ordinary language philosophers were inspired
by the thought of the later Wittgenstein. Id. at 297. He states that Wittgenstein did not
believe that the use of an ideal language would be helpful in philosophical analysis. Id.;
LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 12.
55. See James W. Cornman, Uses of Language and Philosophical Problems, in
LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 227. Cornman writes that the ordinary language
philosophers claimed that philosophical problems can be solved and dissolved by properly
classifying the uses of the language in which the problems are expressed. Id.; LINGUISTIC
TURN, supra note 43, at 3.
January 1996]
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view, philosophers have formulated philosophical problems in what
looks like ordinary English, but have in fact misused the language by
using terms jargonistically 6 Thus, if philosophers would use terms
as the ordinary person uses them, they would not be able to raise
philosophical problems." Accordingly, following the later Wittgen-
stein, ordinary language philosophers adopted as their method the
description of the logical behavior of the linguistic expressions of
ordinary language.5 8 In so doing, philosophical problems could be
dissolved.
C. Bobbitt's Method
Bobbitt's approach seems to follow the later Wittgensteinian
descriptive project and appears to be an attempt to allow us to stop
doing legal philosophy-to stop seeking to justify our answers to legal
questions. 9 Thus, Bobbitt's project is to describe actual legal
practice: the ways in which lawyers argue for propositions-the
modalities. Bobbitt describes six forms or modalities of arguments
that lawyers use to argue for the truth or falsity of constitutional
claims. The six modalities of constitutional argument are:
the historical (relying on the intentions of the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution); textual (looking to the meaning
of the words of the Constitution alone, as they would be
interpreted by the average contemporary "man on the
street"); structural (inferring rules from the relationships that
the Constitution mandates among the structures it sets up);
doctrinal (applying rules generated by precedent); ethical
(deriving rules from those moral commitments of the
American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution); and
prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of a
particular rule).',
56. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 12; Nelson Goodman, The Significance ofDer
Logische Aufbau Der Welt, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at
545. Goodman observes that the ordinary language philosophers believed that
philosophical problems arose from a lack of care in the use of ordinary language.
Goodman, supra, at 553. They recommended explaining in ordinary language the nature
and misuse or misunderstanding of use. Id.
57. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 12.
58. Id. at 19.
59. Patterson, supra note 1, at 303 (Wittgenstein is the "philosophical inspiration for
Bobbitt's position.").
60. BOBBITr, supra note 1, at 12-13.
[Vol. 29:545
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According to Bobbitt, these modalities are the ways in which a legal
proposition is true.61 The task of jurisprudence is simply to describe
our legal practice-the forms of legal argument.62
For Bobbitt, then, a judicial decision is justified if one of the six
modalities is used to reach the decision.' Similarly, according to
Bobbitt, a legal decision is legitimate to the extent that it follows the
forms of argument recognized within our legal culture-that is, the
modalities.64
What happens when the modalities conflict? The modalities can
be used to generate different outcomes.65 Bobbitt asserts that the
fact that the modalities sometimes conflict is preferable to having
some overarching meta-rule to resolve modal conflicts that would
eliminate the possibility of moral choice in constitutional decision
making.66 "The incommensurate modalities give us various possible
worlds against which to measure our sense of justice and fitness."67
Thus, Bobbitt has dissolved the problems of jurisprudence. The
modalities are the ways in which propositions of law are shown to be
true or false.68 Contrary to the received view in jurisprudence, they
are not true by virtue of something independent of the modalities and
external to law as it is generally understood.69 Thus, jurisprudence
is to be concerned only with describing internal modalities-describing
actual legal practice. There is no effort to justify that any particular
argument is objectively a right answer. Any answer that is based on
one of the modalities is legitimate. Thus, the jurisprudential
61. Id. at 34; Patterson, supra note 1, at 295.
62. Patterson, supra note 1, at 295.
63. BOBBITI, supra note 1, at 183-84; Patterson, supra note 1, at 295.
64. BOBBrT, supra note 1, at 27-28; see Nichol, supra note 19, at 1111. The modalities
Bobbitt identifies are the ways that law statements are assessed. Id. No appropriate
constitutional argument exists outside of the modalities. Id.; see also Thomas D. Eisele,
The Activity of Being a Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit of Implications and Possibilities,
54 TENN. L. RFV. 345 (1986). Eisele has developed a similar Wittgensteinian account
regarding the authority of law. Eisele, supra, at 376. Eisele argues that the authority of
law is a function of the ways in which we generate law. Id. The means of creating law are
equally the means of creating the authority of law. Id. According to Eisele this
conception replaces a positivistic notion of authority, whereby the authority of law is
derived from the position of the one positing it, with a notion of authority whereby the
authority of law is derived from the methods by which it is generated. Id.
65. BOBBIT', supra note 1, at 155.
66. Id. at 157-62.
67. Id. at 157.
68. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 301.
69. I&
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problem-justifying answers to legal questions-disappears. It is
replaced by a simple description of the types of arguments that
lawyers use.70
D. Internal Versus External Approaches
Although he does not discuss the views of Bobbitt, Douglas Lind
has recently offered a similar view of constitutional adjudication.7'
Lind identifies an external point of view which has dominated
approaches to constitutional adjudication.' Externalist approaches
to constitutional interpretation seek to evaluate legal practice on the
basis of criteria external to that practice.73 They typically seek to
discover some fundamental axioms of political morality or rules of
interpretation that should be used in legal decision making.74 Thus,
legal theorists usually evaluate the results of legal decision making by
deriving constitutional meaning from standards lying outside the
practice of adjudication."
In contrast to this approach, Lind recommends "internality."76
Influenced by the later Wittgenstein approach, he argues that
adjudication stands independently of externalist theory.77 According
to this internal point of view, there is no way to evaluate legal
decision making except by internal investigation of judicial practice.78
One who takes the internalist point of view studies the practice of a
craft to ascertain and describe the interpretive methods and linguistic
70. See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1107. Nichol observes that Bobbitt has turned away
from traditional efforts to legitimize constitutional review in favor of a description of
accepted conventions. Id at 1110; see Patterson, supra note 1, at 294 n.78. Professor
Patterson emphasizes that it is essential to understand that for Bobbitt there is nothing
more to constitutional argument than the six modalities. Patterson, supra note 1, at 294
n.78. He notes that Bobbitt argues that there is nothing more for philosophy to do than
describe the practice of constitutional argument. Id.
71. Lind, supra note 1, at 353-57.
72. I. at 356.
73. I. at 359.
74. I at 356.
75. Id. at 356-57.
76. Id. at 357.
77. Id.
78. I.; see also Thomas D. Eisele, "Our Real Need": Not Explanation, But Education,
in WITrGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 29, 38 (advocating a
Wittgensteinian internalist approach to law). Eisele states that since philosophical
questions arise in everyday language, we ought to be able to solve it in the same language
without having to appeal to some other external discourse-for example, a scientific
discourse. WrITGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 1, at 38.
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conventions employed by the practitioners. 7 According to this point
of view, practitioners of a craft adopt methods of interpretation that
respond to the internal demands of their practice.8 0 Internality
further sees meanings as bound up in practice.8 '
Given this, Lind says that the internalist approach to adjudication
is based on the idea that meaning and judgment are inextricably
interwoven with practice.' Thus, he seeks to ascertain and describe
the conventions actually employed by the practitioners of adjudi-
cation.' According to Lind, his internal investigation of adjudicative
practice reveals that judicial decisions are justified to the extent that
they satisfy the internal conditions of adjudicative excel-
lence-impartiality, reasoned explanation, articulative boundaries,
coherence, and workability.
84
In contrast, external legal theorists seek to discover principles for
legal decision making that are external to judicial practice and outside
of law. 5 Thus, they have sought to bring principles and methods
79. Lind, supra note 1, at 359.
80. Id. at 360.
81. Id Lind relies on the later Wittgenstein approach for justification of the
internalist view. Id. at 361. According to Lind, Wittgenstein emphasized the integration
of judgment with practice. Id In Wittgenstein's view externalist approaches involve a
fundamental mistake of understanding. Id. at 362. Externalist methods involve standing
outside any human activity or practice-for example, law-and evaluating the results of
judgment. Id. at 363. In Wittgenstein's view, the confusion of externalism results from a
misunderstanding regarding the nature of language. Id at 362. In his view, externalism
treats language as a calculus proceeding according to exact rules. Id. The extemalist seeks
the meaning of a word or concept by trying to ascertain its real definition. Id. This
generates a problem: Since the definition is separate from the concrete usage of the word,
there is always the possibility that the next application of the word will contradict or fall
outside the boundary fixed by the definition. Id at 363. In his view, no definition going
to the "essence" of the term could avoid this possibility of refutation. Id.
In contrast to the externalist approach which posits a definition for a word or concept,
Wittgenstein says the meaning of a word is determined by its use in particular cases. Id
at 364-65. Understanding the meaning of a.proposition requires an investigation in how
it is used in particular cases. Id at 366. Propositions, then, get their meaning from their
use within a system of language. Id. Wittgenstein used the term "language game" to
emphasize that speaking a language is an activity or a form of life. Id. Language cannot
be separated from action. Id. Thus, understanding the meaning of a proposition requires
inquiry into the activity or practice which constitutes the form of life within which the
language game serves as the language of discourse. Id Practice, then, is the form of life
wherein language games are played. Id. at 367. In Wittgenstein's view, no area of human
activity can be understood except by always thinking of the practice. Id at 368.
82. Id at 369.
83. id at 359.
84. Id at 378.
85. Id at 370.
January 1996]
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from such disciplines as philosophy or literary criticism).6  Thus,
Bobbitt's approach may be seen as an internalist view. Like Lind,
Bobbitt seeks to evaluate judicial practice by internal investigation
and description of judicial practice.'
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE INTERNALIST DESCRIPTIVE PROJECT:
PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE SYSTEM
To place the discussion in context, it is helpful to consider some
examples of jurisprudential theories that might be viewed as
externalist attempts to reform our current legal practice." Theorists
on both the right and the left have sought to explain constitutional
decision making by tying it to inquiries external to the practice
itself.89 One of the best known examples is the view of Ronald
Dworkin." Dworkin has proposed a theory of adjudication that he
calls "law as integrity."9' According to Dworkin, judges who accept
the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by attempting to
find a principle that both fits and justifies a threshold amount of some
complex part of legal practice. 92 The fit test means that an interpre-
tation of some part of the law must fit most of the existing legal
materials. 3 In Dworkin's view, hard cases arise when the threshold
86. Id.at 370-71.
87. See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1111 (citing PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982)). According to Bobbitt constitutional decision
making is a practice. Id. "No external reference is necessary to legitimize it-whether
Dworkin's moral and political philosophy [or] Fish's interpretive community... ." Id. at
1111-12.
88. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 255.
89. See Nichol, supra note 19, at 1112.
90. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3; RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER
OF PRINCIPLE (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. For recent articles on Dworkin's views, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on Dworkin and the Two Faces of Law, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 553 (1991); John Fellas, Reconstructing Law's Empire, 73 B.U. L. REV. 715
(1993); Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal
Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1993); John Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, 7
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1977).
91. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 176-275.
92. Fellas, supra note 90, at 734.
93. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 255; Keating, supra note 90, at 24.
Keating points out that the fit test means that the interpretation must, by and large,
vindicate the law as it is. Keating, supra note 90, at 24. No interpretation, however, will
justify all of the existing legal materials. let Thus, the interpretation may show some part
of the legal history as mistaken. Id. The interpretation, then, will justify most, and
criticize some, of the relevant legal materials. Id at 25.
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fit test does not discriminate between two or more interpretations of
some line of cases.94 The dimension of justification becomes relevant
here.9 The judge must choose between competing interpretations
by asking which shows the community's structure of institutions and
decisions in a better light from the standpoint of substantive political
morality.6 Thus, Dworkin calls for the fusion of law and moral
theory.97 According to Dworkin's theory, then, propositions of law
are true if they figure in, or follow from, the principles of justice,
fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive
interpretation of the community's legal practice.98 The truth of legal
propositions is a function of something that goes beyond the
modalities identified by Bobbitt or specifically legal discourse-that
is, principles of justice or morality.99
Another leading example of an externalist is Robert Bork.
According to Bork, adjudication should be restricted to an inquiry
into the political morality of the Framers of the Constitution."° The
goal of judicial decision making is to relate the Framers' values to
today's world.1 This is accomplished by translating the morality of
the Framers into rules applicable to contemporary circumstances.0 2
In essence, Bork's theory holds that legal answers are deemed right
insofar as they conform to principles of political morality and sound
governmental structure. 3
Externalist proposals to reform the system also come from the
political left."°  According to Bobbitt, some of these theorists
simply elevate one form of the modalities-the prudential mode-and
advance it as the method of justification in law.105 According to
prudentialist arguments, judicial decision making is justified to the
94. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 255-56.
95. Id
96. Id at 256.
97. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 90, at 215-16; see also
Fellas, supra note 90, at 734 (stating that the selection of an interpretation directly engages
the judge's own moral convictions).
98. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 224.
99. Patterson, supra note 1, at 279.
100. Lind, supra note 1, at 376.
101. ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10
(1984).
102. Lind, supra note 1, at 376.
103. Id at 377.
104. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).
105. See BOBBITr, supra note 1, at 123, 128.
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extent that it produces effects worth having.0 6 As Bobbitt notes,
the prudentialist also must rely on some standard external to the law
to enable the measurement of "better."1°7
IV. AN EVALUATION
Although the views of Wittgenstein have recently been applied
to the problems of jurisprudence, philosophers have considered the
later Wittgensteinian descriptive approach in a number of other
areas of philosophy. The arguments generated by those philosophers
would appear to apply by analogy to the current Wittgensteinian
descriptive project in law. This section holds that these arguments
support the conclusion that the Wittgensteinian project should be
rejected because: (1) the descriptive program is actually a proposal
to reform the system and does not differ significantly from externalist
proposals to reform the system; and (2) there is no reason why legal
philosophers should be satisfied with merely describing the modalities
of ordinary legal argument. Legal philosophers should instead seek
to reconstruct our legal practices. This section also argues that the
Wittgensteinian project should be repudiated because legal
propositions seem to require more of a justification than that they are
derived from an internal modality; the neo-Wittgensteinian view of
truth is unacceptable; adjudicative practice is actually externalist;
and the neo-Wittgensteinian 'approach seems to be a type of
formalism.
A. The Critique of the Ordinary Language Descriptive Project
Philosophers have cautioned against ignoring the lessons of
history."0 They warn that without such historical knowledge, we
will repeat the errors of earlier times."° Thus, philosophers have
recognized that modem legal theory can benefit from remembering
106. Patterson, supra note 1, at 274; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and
the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1768 (1990) (Matsuda suggests
that judicial decision making in the area of civil rights is justified to the extent that it
rectifies past injustice and eliminates all forms of subordination.); Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech." Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2320, 2325
(1989) (outsider jurisprudence seeks ajust world free of existing conditions of domination).
107. BOBBrT, supra note 1, at 128.
108. See, e.g., Douglas Lind, Free Legal Decision and the Interpretive Return in Modern
Legal Theory, 38 AM. J. JURIS. 159, 184 (1993).
109. Id.
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the work of our intellectual predecessors."0  Accordingly, this
section suggests that in order to illuminate and evaluate the neo-
Wittgensteinian project in law, it is helpful to examine the history of
the Wittgensteinian descriptive approach in other areas of philosophy.
In this regard, ideal language philosophers offered a number of
objections to the ordinary language descriptive project. First, Grover
Maxwell and Herbert Feigl argued that the purported descriptions of
ordinary usage were actually disguised reformations."' They argued
that the ordinary language philosopher purported to describe various
separate and distinct meanings or uses that were already there in
ordinary language."' They questioned whether ordinary persons
were aware of such meanings."' They contended that calling
attention to various uses of relevant terms did not demonstrate that
this was an accurate description of the situation." This was be-
cause it was unclear whether in so doing they had offered "tightened
up" or "reformed" meanings. 5 Given this, purported descriptions
of ordinary language were disguised reformations."6 As a result,
the ordinary language project differed only in degree from the ideal
language project. Thus, contrary to Wittgenstein's view, the ordinary
language philosophers could not "leave everything as it is" in ordinary
language.1 7  When they identified separate meanings or uses of
terms, they were really claiming that English could be made into an
ideal language and not discovering that it was one."'
These concerns seem applicable by analogy to Bobbitt's-or any
other-neo-Wittgensteinian descriptive project. Bobbitt purports to
describe our ordinary methods of legal argument. This seems
analogous to the ordinary language philosophers' attempt to describe
110. See, e.g., id. at 161-62 (examining the work of the early twentieth-century "Free
Legal Decision Theorists" to shed light on the concerns and content of modern legal
theory).
111. See Grover Maxwell & Herbert Feigl, Why Ordinary Language Needs Reforming,
in LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 193; LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 19-20.
112. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 19.
113. Maxwell & Feigl, supra note 111, at 193. They asked in what sense are these
various meanings already there in ordinary language waiting for the philosopher to unearth
them. Id.
114. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 20.
115. Id
116. Maxwell & Feigl, supra note 111, at 194 (stating that they suspect that many cases
of purported ordinary language analysis are, in fact, disguised reformations); LINGUISTIC
TURN, supra note 43, at 20.
117. LINGUISTIC TURN, supra note 43, at 20.
118. Id
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the actual meaning or use of words in ordinary language. These
descriptions, however, of our ordinary legal practices may actually be
a disguised reformation of our legal practices.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that Bobbitt's modalities do not
accurately describe our current practice. For example, Martin Redish
has observed that the forms of constitutional argument described by
Bobbitt have been artificially distinguished along lines which do not
exist in reality.119 For example, Redish contends that the "doctrin-
al" modality refers to neutral principles of general application to a
legal, rather than political, context."W Redish argues, however, that
there is no reason why those neutral principles of general application
cannot be derived from the other modalities-that is, historical
understanding, a structural approach, an ethical analysis, or textual
construction."' Given this, it appears that Bobbitt is not accurately
describing our forms of argument and is actually claiming that our
legal practice could be reconstructed along the lines of his proposed
modalities.
In this regard, Douglas Lind, another neo-Wittgensteinian, also
purports to describe the interpretive methods and linguistic conven-
tions that are actually used by practitioners of constitutional adjudica-
tion.1" According to Lind, judicial decisions are justified to the extent
that they satisfy the conditions of adjudicative excellence."2 These
internal conditions require that judicial decisions be arrived at
impartially, rest on reasoned explanation, and satisfy objectives of
coherence and workability while setting articulative boundaries for
future applications.24 Like Bobbitt, Lind purports to describe
adjudicative practice. Yet Lind has identified different modalities
from those described by Bobbitt. Thus, it seems that the new
Wittgensteinians are not able to simply describe modalities which
would then be used to justify legal propositions. Contrary to
Wittgenstein's dictum, they cannot leave everything as it is. They are
actually proposing that our legal practice could be reconstructed along
the lines of their suggested modalities. Such modalities would then
be used to justify legal propositions. Under these circumstances, the
119. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 MiCH. L. REV. 665,
668 (1984).
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Lind, supra note 1, at 359.
123. a d at 378.
,124. Id. at 369-70.
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neo-Wittgensteinian project seems to differ only in degree from the
externalist theories which may also be viewed as attempts to
reconstruct our legal practice by offering external ways of justifying
legal propositions.
To understand other difficulties with the descriptive project, it is
helpful to consider the attack on the ordinary language descriptive
approach made by moral philosophers. In the middle part of this
century, it was popular for moral philosophers-under the strong
influence of Wittgenstein-to argue that the job of moral philosophers
was to simply describe the actual meaning or use of ethical words as
they appear in moral language.125
Again, this is very similar to Bobbitt's project: He seeks to
describe our ordinary methods of legal argument-that is, the modal-
ities. Other moral philosophers identified certain general problems
with the approach. The project of the Wittgensteinians in ethics was
to describe a conceptual scheme or network-that is, to describe
accurately the moral language of a community. There was no reason,
however, to be satisfied with such a conceptual scheme for ethics. 26
For example, Richard Brandt, a leading ethicist, argued: A moral
philosopher should be satisfied with a conceptual network only "if it
enables him to raise all the questions concerning conduct and choice
and preference he thinks it is important to raise and distinguish.""z
Thus, Brandt contended that philosophers should not simply seek to
describe but, instead, should engage in a more reconstructive
enterprise-reconstruct our conceptual schemes in order to solve the
types of problems that life in society poses.'28
Rudolf Carnap, who played a leading role in twentieth century
philosophy,29 also argued against the ordinary language descriptive
125. Richard B. Brandt, Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language, in FREEDOM
& MORALITY 1, 10 (John Bricke ed., 1976).
126. See id. at 13.
127. Id.
128. Id; see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 579 (1971). John Rawls also
rejected the view that moral philosophy depends primarily on the analysis of the ordinary
meanings of moral words in order to establish their logical properties, and, therefore, the
rules of valid moral argument. See R.M. Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, in READING
RAWLS 81, 82, 85 (Norman Daniels ed., 1974). As Rawls explained, he sought to leave
questions of meaning and definition aside in order to get on with the task of developing
a substantive theory of justice. READING RAWLS, supra, at 579.
129. See THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at xv. For recent
reappraisals of Carnap's philosophy, see Guy S. Axtell, In the Tracks of the Historicist
Movement: Re-assessing the Carnap-Kuhn Connection, 24 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 119
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approach and, like Brandt, emphasized the importance of the
introduction of new linguistic frameworks or conceptual schemes in
order to resolve philosophical problems.130 Carnap treated scientific
theories as languages. 3' He developed views about revolutionary
scientific thinking analogous to Thomas Kuhn's view of revolutionary
science.132 According to Carnap, scientific revolutions occur when
one theoretical language becomes another language." Thus,
Carnap discussed the procedures involved in formulating and in
choosing alternate languages or linguistic frameworks." In his
view, problems involved in choosing and constructing languages
belong to the context of language planning. 35 Through his work in
logic he came to see the problems connected with selecting language
forms suitable for certain purposes.3 6 He came to understand that
one cannot speak of the correct language form because various forms
have different strengths in different respects. 37 Language planning
is based on the insight that language forms are not right or wrong.'
The evaluation of language forms must turn on practical consider-
ations.'39
Thus, contrary to the ordinary language philosophers, Carnap
argued that one should not decree dogmatic prohibitions against new
linguistic forms."' Instead, new linguistic forms should be tested by
their success or failure in practical use. 4 According to Camap,
(1993); Michael Friedman, Carnap's Au/bau Reconsidered, 21 NOUS 521 (1987); Michael
Friedman, The Re-evaluation of Logical Positivism, 88 J. PHIL. 505 (1991); George A.
Reisch, Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?, 58 PHIL. SC. 264 (1991).
130. See Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in LINGUISTIC TURN,
supra note 43, at 72-84 [hereinafter Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology].
131. See Reisch, supra note 129, at 270. Reisch observes that theories comprise
observational and theoretical vocabularies. Id. They involve rules of sentence formation
and invoke certain logical rules. Id.
132. Id at 270; THOMAs KUHN, THE STRUCrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
133. See Reisch, supra note 129, at 271; see also Axtell, supra note 129, at 121 (Carnap
believed that scientific revolutions bring with them proposals for a new conceptual as well
as linguistic framework.).
134. Reisch, supra note 129, at 271.
135. Id; see also Axtell, supra note 129, at 121 (Carnap argued that scientists become
language planners.).
136. See Reisch, supra note 129, at 271.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also Axtell, supra note 129, at 121 (Scientists choose linguistic frameworks
based upon what is practical.).
140. See Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, supra note 130, at 83.
141. Id.
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those who work in any field of investigation should have the freedom
to use any form of expression or language or conceptual scheme
which seems useful to them.42 Thus, Carnap argued that in select-
ing a conceptual scheme, we should be pragmatists and select the
conceptual scheme or linguistic framework that serves as an efficient
instrument.143
In this regard, Carnap wrote that both ordinary language
philosophers and ideal language philosophers or constructionists
sought to clarify and resolve philosophical problems.'" In Carnap's
view, most of these problems resulted from an inappropriate use of
language.' 45  Carnap argued that to solve these problems, the
constructionist may prefer the use of a newly constructed term not
belonging to ordinary language."4 How far the constructionist
moved from ordinary language would depend on what he or she
regarded as useful in the particular case.' 47
In taking this approach, Carnap responded to a principal
argument for the ordinary language descriptivist approach which he
set forth as follows." The roots of philosophical problems lie in
ordinary language. 49 Therefore, the difficulties must be eliminated
by the analysis of ordinary language.15 ° Thus, to seek to resolve
these difficulties by the proposal of a reformed or constructed
language would be to do something totally irrelevant.' It would
direct our attention from the original problems to different con-
cepts.52
In response, Carnap argued that the ordinary language philoso-
phers seemed to view ordinary language as something that could not
142. Id. at 83-84.
143. See CHALLENGES TO EMPIRICISM 19 (Harold Morick ed., 1980); see also Axtell,
supra note 129, at 121 (noting that Carnap argued that theory change is better viewed as
improvement of instrument rather than as search for ideal system).
144. See Rudolf Carnap, P.F Strawson on Linguistic Naturalism, in THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at 933, 936.
145. Id.
146. Id at 937.
147. Id.; Reisch, supra note 129, at 272. The freedom to adopt linguistic forms
according to one's purposes is the substance of Carnap's "principle of tolerance." Reisch,
supra note 129, at 272.
148. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at 937.
149. Id. at 937-38.
150. Id. at 938.
151. Id
152. Id.
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be changed or replaced.153 Contrary to the ordinary language
philosophers, however, Carnap argued that a language, whether
natural or artificial, is an instrument that may be replaced or modified
according to our needs, like any other instrument.5 It is something
we have learned. 55 Therefore, we can replace it with another
language.156  Carnap said that ordinary language is like a crude
pocket knife. 57  It may be useful for certain purposes.' For
some purposes, however, special tools are more efficient. 59 Thus,
if the pocket knife is too crude, we should replace it with a more
suitable tool." According to Carnap, the thesis of the ordinary
language philosophers is like saying that by using a special tool, we
evade the problem of the correct use of the cruder tool.16' In
Carnap's view, however, that argument is not persuasive-we should
not criticize someone for using a more sophisticated tool to solve
problems that a more primitive tool could not resolve.' 62 Thus,
Carnap concluded that the choice of a method for the solution of
philosophical problems-ideal language approach versus ordinary
language approach-should be decided by practical consider-
ations.'6
Carnap's discussion is particularly relevant because an argument
analogous to the pro-ordinary language argument that he describes
has also been advanced by the new Wittgensteinians in the legal
context. For example, Lind argues that external legal theorists allow
for determination of legal meaning to take place wholly independent
153. Id
154. Id. at 938-39; see also Reisch, supra note 129, at 275 (value of linguistic frameworks
resides in their utility with respect to practical purposes).
155. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at 938.
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id at 938-39.
160. Id at 939; see also Reisch, supra note 129, at 275 (noting that Carnap argued that
philosophical instruments may prove useless and become extinct).
161. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RUDOLF CARNAP, supra note 44, at 939.
162. Id
163. See id.; Reisch, supra note 129, at 274. Carnap's principle of tolerance-that is,
the freedom to adopt linguistic forms according to one's purposes-ensures that there is
no one ideal philosophical model of scientific theory. Reisch, supra note 129, at 274.
Instead, various philosophical goals will engender species of philosophical instruments. Id.
These instruments will each be intended to clarify and reconstruct scientific reasoning for
a particular set of purposes. Id. at 274-75. Just as organic species may become more fit
in their respective niches, these different philosophical instruments may become more
fruitful in fulfilling their purposes. Id. at 275.
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of the practice of adjudication.1' 6  According to the new
Wittgensteinians' internalist account, however, the practice of
adjudication provides the only authoritative standard of constitutional
meaning.16 Lind, therefore, contends that since external theorists
base constitutional meaning on standards which lie outside the
practice of adjudication, they issue judgments of constitutional right
and wrong which are fundamentally irrelevant 66 Thus, just as the
ideal language philosophers' proposals to reconstruct language were
said to be fundamentally irrelevant in that they direct our attention
away from the original concerns, so too are externalist proposals to
reconstruct the practice of law.
The arguments and considerations raised by Carnap and Brandt
would seem to apply by analogy to Bobbitt's-and any other-
Wittgensteinian internalist descriptive approach to legal philosophy.
At the outset there is no reason why philosophers or lawyers should
be satisfied with describing accurately the modalities of ordinary legal
argument. Other legal practices or conceptual schemes might be
better suited to solving the problems of our society. Thus, arguably,
legal philosophers should seek to reconstruct our legal practic-
es-modes of argumentation-in order to create a conceptual scheme
that will better solve the types of legal problems presented in social
life. As for the argument that externalist accounts are irrelevant, it
seems that one can construct a response analogous to Carnap's
argument against the ordinary language philosophers. Our current
forms of legal argumentation may be too crude a tool. If externalist
forms of legal justification would be a more helpful instrument, then
we should attempt to construct such schemes to help resolve practical
problems. We should not decree dogmatic prohibitions against
externalist accounts. The choice of a method for the solution of
jurisprudential problems-internal versus external approaches-should
be decided by practical considerations.
164. See Lind, supra note 1, at 390.
165. Id.
166. See id.; Patterson, supra note 1, at 292. Professor Patterson interprets Bobbitt to
suggest that by importing an explanatory model from another discipline, we lose law and
legal craft. Patterson, supra note 1, at 292. If law is an activity and not a thing, the
replacement of legal with economic or philosophical vocabulary is not to change the law;
rather it is to do economics or philosophy. Id.
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B. Some Recent Views on the Importance of Developing New
Conceptual Schemes
In recent years, theorists have continued to emphasize the
importance of developing new conceptual schemes. These views also
support the rejection of the new Wittgensteinians' project in law. For
example, the importance of constructing new conceptual schemes
recently has been further developed by the philosopher Alasdair
MacIntyre. 67 According to MacIntyre, traditions begin in some
condition of pure historical contingency.'6' They reflect the beliefs
and practices of some particular community.169 All such communi-
ties are always in a state of change. 70 Eventually, incoherences in
the established system of beliefs becomes apparent. In the face
of these inadequacies, the community must reformulate their beliefs
or remake their practices." Thus, MacIntyre identifies three stages
in the development of a tradition. First, the relevant beliefs have not
been called into question. Second, inadequacies in the system of
beliefs have been identified but not yet remedied. Third, a response
to those inade uacies has resulted in reformulations.
Once the third stage is reached, those members of a community
who have accepted the beliefs of the tradition in their new form can
contrast their new beliefs with the old.7  A tradition that has
evolved to this point will become a form of enquiry. 74 Central to
each tradition-constituted enquiry at each stage in its development
167. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988);
Charles Larmore, Book Review, 86 J. PHIL. 437 (1989) (reviewing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988)). Maclntyre's principle claim is that
rationality, in ethics and elsewhere, is possible only within a tradition. Larmore, supra,
at 437-38. According to Maclntyre the controversies about justice follow from the absence
of any coherent tradition fostering a shared conception of practical reason. Id. at 438. For
other articles on Maclntyre's work, see Julia Annas, Maclntyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 388 (1989); Brian Barry, The Light That Failed, 100 ETHICS 160 (1989) (book
review); Jeffrey C. Isaac, Book Review, 17 POL. THEORY 663 (1989) (reviewing ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988)); Martha Nussbaum,
Recoiling From Reason, 36 THE N.Y. REV. BOOKS 36 (1989) (book review).
168. MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 354; Larmore, supra note 167, at 438 (According
to Maclntyre, rational thought always begins from contingently given beliefs; beliefs which
are ours just because we belong to some particular tradition of thought.).
169. MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 354.
170. Id
171. Id. at 355.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 356.
174. Id. at 358.
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will be its current agenda of unsolved problems. Conflicts over
rival answers cannot be settled rationally. The methods of
enquiry and the forms of argument disclose new inadequacies,
incoherences, and problems for which there is no solution within the
established tradition.'" MacIntyre refers to this state of affairs as
an epistemological crisis."8
According to MacIntyre, the solution to such a crisis requires the
invention of new concepts and the framing of a new theory.'7 9 For
this new conceptual scheme to put an end to this crisis, it must
provide solutions to problems that had previously proved intracta-
ble." These new conceptual structures will not be derivable from
the earlier positions. 1 Thus, imaginative conceptual innovation
must occur."8 The justification for the new conceptual scheme will
lie in its ability to achieve what could not have been achieved prior
to that innovation."
In MacIntyre's view, every tradition confronts the possibility that
it will fall into a state of epistemological crisis.Y Such a crisis will
be identifiable by its own standards of justification. 1"5 Not all
epistemological crises are resolved successfuly. 6  Their lack of
resolution can defeat the tradition.'
If MacIntyre is right, then every tradition or practice may fall
into an epistemological crisis. Thus, our current legal practices may
prove unable to provide solutions to new problems. Under these
circumstances, viewing jurisprudence as merely a descriptive ef-
fort-an effort to describe a current conceptual scheme-will not be
helpful in resolving epistemological crises. To resolve such crises,
175. Id. at 361.
176. I& at 362.
177. See Annas, supra note 167, at 388. A tradition of rational inquiry can become
static or sterile. Id. at 392.
178. MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 362.
179. Id
180. Id
181. 1d
182. Id
183. Id; Annas, supra note 167, at 392 ("Rational superiority to other traditions consists
not in the [impossible] feat of arguing the others down, but in having the conceptual
resources to explain convincingly one's own tradition's success and the other traditions'
failure in meeting this kind of challenge.").
184. MACINTYRE, supra note 167, at 364.
185. Id
186. Id. at 365.
187. Id
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one must have a conception of jurisprudence that involves the
construction or reformation of our present practices or conceptual
structures.
The importance of developing new conceptual schemes in law is
also advocated by pragmatists 88 and feminist theorists. For exam-
ple, Margaret Radin has discussed the problem of "bad coherence" in
our legal institutions.'89 Pragmatists generally have advocated
coherence theories of truth.9 ' According to a coherence theory of
truth, we will count an idea as true if we can use it to assimilate a
new experience to our old beliefs without disturbing them too
much."' Coherence theories generate a problem: It is possible to
have a coherent system of belief and have that system be coherently
bad."9  For example, racist or sexist systems can be coherently
bad.193  Thus, the pragmatist faces the question of how to find a
standpoint to argue that a system is coherent but bad if pragmatism
defines truth as coherence." According to Radin, the solution for
bad coherence is for the pragmatist to find a way to transform
alternative conceptual possibilities into legal realities.195  The
pragmatist must find a way for the law to be understood to include
the conceptions of the oppressed-women and minorities-even if
legal institutions currently exclude them.' Women and minorities
188. Recently, there has been a revival of pragmatism in American legal thought. See
Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988);
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989); Margaret
J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990); Steven D.
Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409 (1990); Symposium on the
Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
189. Radin, supra note 188, at 1710.
190. lt at 1708; see Daniel C.K. Chow, A Pragmatic Model of Law, 67 WASH. L. REV.
755 (1992). Professor Chow observes that pragmatists measure the validity of a belief by
determining how well that belief coheres with other beliefs. Chow, supra, at 775. He
writes that all legal pragmatists adopt some version of a pragmatic, coherentist
epistemology. Id.
191. Radin, supra note 188, at 1709.
192. Id. at 1710.
193. 1&t
194. I&
195. Id. at 1721.
196. Id.; Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
Professor West argues that women's lives are not reflected at any level in any field of legal
doctrine. West, supra, at 58. She asserts that the distinctive values women hold are not
reflected in legal theory because legal theory is about actual enacted or adjudicated law,
and women have from law's inception lacked the power to make law protect or value
women's experience. Id. at 60. Thus, she concludes that we will not have an ungendered
jurisprudence until we have legal doctrine that takes women's lives as seriously as it takes
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have not formulated the present legal conceptual scheme. 97 Such
outsiders, then, must struggle to make room for themselves in the
current legal institutions.'98 They must develop perspectives of the
oppressed to infiltrate dominant legal institutional coherence.'99
Otherwise their perspective is not represented in legal institutions.'°
Through these alternative conceptions legal practices can be re-
made.2 1  Thus, to the extent that Bobbitt's-or any other neo-
Wittgensteinian's-project would confine the role of jurisprudence to
description of our current practices, the problem of bad coherence is
not addressed. Since outsiders-women and minorities-did not
contribute to the formulation of our practices, the perspectives of
women .and minorities are excluded and the potential for bad
coherence is raised.202
C The Need for Explanation and Justification
According to Bobbitt, a judicial decision is justified if one of the
six modalities is used to reach the decision.' There is no effort to
offer a further justification that any particular decision is objectively
a right answer. The lack of further justification is consistent with
Wittgenstein's position that explanation must come to an end
somewhere-that at some point the reasons give out.C 4 In Wittgen-
stein's view, it is characteristic of philosophical investigation that a
major difficulty is not that of finding a solution to philosophical
problems but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it.2"5 This is because we
men's. Id.
197. See Radin, supra note 188, at 1725.
198. Id. at 1724-25.
199. Ia- at 1724.
200. 1d at 1724-25; Chow, supra note 190, at 815. Chow observes that critical prag-
matists reject positive law that does not reflect the excluded voices or viewpoints of
minorities and women. Chow, supra note 190, at 815.
201. Radin, supra note 188, at 1725-26.
202. Cf. Chow, supra note 190, at 820-21 ("Traditions may reflect the values of the
politically powerful who have engineered a private hierarchy that secures advantages at
the expense of the politically disempowered.").
203. BOBBITIr, supra note 1, at 183-84.
204. See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 31, para. 217,
at 85.
205. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL para. 314, at 58e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds. & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1970) ("Here we come up against a
remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty-I
might say-is not that of finding the solution but father that of recognizing as the solution
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mistakenly expect an explanation, whereas the solution to the
problem is a description.'
As Robert Fogelin has pointed out, however, Wittgenstein's
general approach to justification is peculiar in that for him the reasons
seem to give out very quickly.'t In Fogelin's view, Wittgenstein
stops his investigation just at the point where many believe the
problems have only been stated.2" In addition, Fogelin has argued
that the Wittgensteinian justifications do not sufficiently seem to be
fundamental to be accorded the status of being brute and inexplica-
ble.' Beyond this, he raises a more general problem in that
Wittgenstein does not tell us how we are to decide when we should
stop and leave explaining alone.
210
These general problems seem to be applicable to the new Witt-
gensteinians' approach to legal justification. Legal propositions seem
to require more of a justification than that they are derived from an
internal modality. This seems particularly evident in light of the fact
that the modalities can be used to generate different outcomes in a
particular case.2 1' Given this, the modalities do not seem to be
sufficiently fundamental to be accorded the status of being brute and
inexplicable. In addition, the new Wittgensteinians seem to offer no
method for determining when we should be satisfied with no further
explanation for legal propositions.
D. Truth
Crucial to the new Wittgensteinians' program is their view of
truth. They suggest that a proposition of law is true if one can show
that one is correctly using the words in question.2 2 This view seems
to identify truth with justification-that is, a statement is true if its
assertion would be justified. For example, Dennis Patterson, one of
the leaders of the new movement, writes that "[t]here is nothing more
to be said about the truth of a proposition of law than advancing the
something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it."); FOGELIN, supra note 20, at
205.
206. FOGELIN, supra note 20, at 285.
207. Id. at 206.
208. Id.
209. I& at 207.
210. Id. at 208-10.
211. BOBBiTr, supra note 1, at 155.
212. Patterson, supra note 1, at 289.
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reasons for its assertion. 213 Thus, for Bobbitt, the modalities are
the ways in which a legal proposition is true.214
To the extent that the neo-Wittgensteinian project identifies truth
with justification, certain problems arise. Truth cannot simply be
justification.215 This is because: (1) truth is supposed to be a
property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can
be lost; and (2) justification is a matter of degree whereas truth is
not.216 To identify truth with justification would require us to give
up the principle that some of the statements which are now justified
may turn out not to be true.217 This is an unacceptable result.2 8
The justification conditions for sentences change as our total body of
knowledge changes.219  Thus, not only may we discover that
statements we now regard as justified are false, but we may even
discover that procedures we now regard as justificatory are not, and
that different justification procedures are better.
E. Is Adjudicative Practice Internalist?
Beyond this, the new Wittgensteinians' internalist approach raises
the question as to whether adjudicative practice is internalist. In this
connection, an investigation into legal practice would seem to reveal
213. Patterson, Poverty, supra note 16, at 56. Significantly, in making this statement,
Patterson relies on Nancy Murphy's assertion that "there is nothing more to be said about
the truth of a theory than to display the justification for holding that theory." Nancy
Murphy, Scientific Realism and Postmodern Philosophy, 41 BRIT. J. PHIL. Sci. 291, 299
(1990). "Some philosophers ... have claimed that truth must be defined or analyzed in
terms of justification or one of its near synonyms, such as warranted assertibility."
RICHARD L. KIRKHAM, THEORIES OF TRUTH 49 (1992).
214. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 34.
215. PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 84; KIRKHAM, supra note 213, at 51 ("[T]o equate 'true'
with 'justified' or to analyze truth even partly in terms of justification is at best a
hopelessly circular analysis.").
216. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 84.
217. Id. at 85.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. If the new Wittgensteinians seek instead to offer a notion of truth as idealized
justified assertibility, other difficulties arise. Donald Davidson has rejected all such
epistemic accounts of truth on the grounds that they are "untenable." See Donald
Davidson, The Structure and Content of Truth, 87 J. PHIL. 279,298 (1990). That epistemic
views are "fundamentally mistaken" can be shown by the fact that they invite skepticism.
IS Davidson argues that epistemic theories are skeptical not because they make reality
unknowable, but because they reduce reality to so much less than we believe there is. Id.
at 298-99. Moreover, they deprive truth of its role as an intersubjective standard. Id. at
309.
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that courts sometimes justify their decisions on the basis of matters
external to law as it is generally understood. For example, Calder v.
Bull"1 is often cited as the least equivocal Supreme Court reference
to the possibility that a statute could be held unconstitutional because
it violated natural law.222  In Calder, Justice Chase said that the
drafters of the federal, and state constitutions intended to create
governments of limited powers and that natural law as well as the
specific provisions of written constitutions restricted governmental
power.21 According to traditional theory, natural law is dictated by
God and is superior in obligation to any other.24 Thus, contrary to
the new Wittgensteinians,2  into the practice of adjudication
reveals some evidence of externalist inquiry into abstract higher
law.
26
More support for the view that adjudicative practice involves
externalist methodology is found in Brown v. Board of Education.227
There, the Supreme Court also justified its decision in part according
to standards that lie outside the practice of adjudication as it is
generally understood. In overturning legally compelled segregation,
the Court relied in part on empirical social science data supporting
the proposition that segregation of children generates a feeling of
221. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
222. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 209-10 n.41 (1980).
223. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 398-400; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 351 (4th ed. 1991).
224. ELY, supra note 222, at 48.
225. For example, Lind states that the Court does not engage in externalist inquiry into
abstract principles of higher law. Lind, supra note 1, at 386. Bobbitt also rejects the view
that natural law is enshrined in the Constitution. BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 168 ("The US
Constitution... refus[es] to enshrine any particular comprehensive morality.").
226. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
717 (1975):
To summarize, there was an original understanding, both implicit and textually
expressed, that unwritten higher law principles had constitutional status. From
the very beginning, and continuously until the Civil War, the courts acted on that
understanding and defined and enforced such principles as part of their function
of judicial review. Aware of that history, the framers of the 14th amendment
reconfirmed the original understanding through the "majestic generalities" of
section 1. And ever since, again without significant break, the courts have
openly proclaimed and enforced unwritten constitutional principles.
Id. at 717; Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127
(1987). Professor Sherry argues that the historical context of the constitution suggests that
it was never intended to displace natural law. Id. at 1177. According to Sherry, the
Framers of the Constitution expected the courts to keep legislatures from transgressing the
natural rights of mankind, whether or not those rights found their way into the written
Constitution. Id.
227. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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inferiority in them.s Thus, contrary to the new Wittgen-
steinians' 9 the Supreme Court seems to have authorized judicial
decisions to be based on external considerations.
Another example of external considerations being used to justify
legal propositions is found in Learned Hand's famous formula for
negligence- 30  Hand defines negligence in terms of an externalist
economic model?3 ' According to Hand negligence is defined by the
following formula: B < PL.32 This means that if the burden to the
injurer of avoiding the accident was less than the loss if the accident
occurred multiplied by the probability that the accident would occur,
the injurer is negligent. 33 Thus, courts sometimes appear to justify
their decisions in terms of matters that are external to law as it is
generally understood.
F A Return to Formalism?
The new Wittgensteinians seem to share certain similarities to
formalism. Although formalism is difficult to define," it refers to
certain ideas that were prominent during the nineteenth century and
during the early part of the twentieth century3 5 Legal formalism
228. Id at 494 n.10; Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 157 (1955)
(discussing social science evidence as a foundation for Supreme Court's decision in
Brown); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991). The so-called
"Brandeis Brief" also is an example of externalist legal practice. Louis Brandeis submitted
a famous brief in the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of a state law limiting
women's working hours in which he based his argument on social statistics analyzing the
effects of prolonged labor on women. Luban, supra, at 1036-37. Such "Brandeis
Briefs"-legal briefs based on empirical data rather than precedent-became an
established form of argument. Id. at 1037.
229. See BOBBITr, supra note 1, at 173-74. Bobbitt writes that if we do law by
reference to a coordinate discipline like psychology or economics, and use the imported
discipline as a rule of decision, "it would de-legitimate the analysis, replacing the legal
approach with one for which there is no constitutional authority."
230. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
231. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 107 (1990).
232. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
233. Id; POSNER, supra note 231, at 54 n.18.
234. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199,215 (1993); see also P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 250 (1987). Atiyah and
Summers observe that although formalism never reached the status of being a legal theory
as such, it did have certain characteristics. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra, at 250.
235. Cloud, supra note 234, at 216. For a recent defense of legal formalism, see
Weinrib, supra note 6; Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers
Know, 60 TEx. L. REV. 35 (1981).
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emphasized formal reasoning-the deductive application of rules to
decide legal issues. 6 Fundamental legal principles and the rules
derived from them governed the outcomes of individual lawsuits, even
if the results they produced conflicted with important social goals. 7
According to the formalist account, the rules governing any dispute
could be found in the body of existing legal materials"3 Such rules
were complete and comprehensive, leaving no gaps in the law. 9
The law operated as a closed system.2 Operating within this
system, judges and lawyers resolved problems by applying rules.241
Such decision making appropriately excluded from consideration any
social goals or values external to the legal system. 42
It has generally been thought that formalism lies in disrepute.243
Pragmatists, among others, argued that formalism overemphasized
deductive analytical methods, rather than the results the theory
produced.2" Formalism prevented the proper use of law as an
instrument that could be used to attain social goals.24 According
to formalists, legal problems were to be resolved from an internal
perspective and not by relying upon goals or standards external to
law.2
,'
The formalist program seems similar to the approach of the new
Wittgensteinians. As Douglas Lind explains, externalist theory is
236. Cloud, supra note 234, at 216; see ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at 250.
237. Cloud, supra note 234, at 216; see ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at 250.
238. Cloud, supra note 234, at 217; Christopher C. Langdell, Address at the
'Quartermillenial' Celebration of Harvard University Nov. 5, 1886, reprinted in Harvard
Celebration Speeches, 3 L.Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
239. Cloud, supra note 234, at 217.
240. Id.
241. ht; see ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at 250.
242. Cloud, supra note 234, at 217.
243. Ld. at 218; ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at 251 (observing that discontent
with formalism became increasingly evident during last decade of nineteenth century).
244. Cloud, supra note 234, at 219; see also ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at
251 ("In attacking formalism, Holmes emphasized that the law is not a comprehensive and
complete 'system of reason' nor a deduction from 'admitted axioms."').
245. Cloud, supra note 234, at 219; see also ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 234, at
252 (Oliver Wendell Holmes stressed the primacy of underlying substantive considerations
over mere logical form); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12
HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) ("[Tjhe real justification of a rule of law, if there be one,
is that it helps to bring about a social end which we desire.").
246. Cloud, supra note 234, at 220; see also Fried, supra note 235, at 38. Fried
concludes that the law is a distinct subject, a branch neither of economics nor of moral
philosophy. Fried, supra note 235, at 38.
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result oriented.247 Externality justifies judicial decisions on the basis
of the outcomes reached in adjudication.2  In contrast, the
internalist takes the position that judicial decisions are justified not
on the basis of their results, but on whether they satisfy certain
internal conditions of adjudicative excellence.249 Thus, according
to the internalist account, external considerations-for example,
abstract moral or economic theory-are irrelevant in adjudication.
Thus, on an internalist view, judges must sometimes permit
obvious injustices if it is required by the law.? According to an
internalist account, judicial decisions may be critiqued only on the
basis of how well they satisfy the internal conditions of adjudicative
excellence, and not on the basis of their results."s  The neo-
Wittgensteinian internalist approach in its refusal to justify decisions
on the basis of values external to law or results, then, seems to have
much in common with formalism. Thus, to the extent that the
formalist approach is defective, so too is the neo-Wittgensteinian
approach.
G. Summary
This Article has concluded that the Wittgensteinian internalist
descriptive approach should be rejected in law. First, the Article has
argued that philosophers have considered the Wittgensteinian
descriptive approach in a number of other areas of philosophy. The
arguments generated by those philosophers appear to apply by
analogy to the current Wittgensteinian project in law. They support
the conclusion that the Wittgensteinian program should be rejected in
law because: (1) the descriptive program is actually a proposal to
reform the system and so does not differ significantly from externalist
proposals to reform the system; and (2) there is no reason why legal
philosophers should be satisfied with merely describing the modalities
of ordinary legal argument. Legal philosophers should instead seek
to reconstruct our legal practices. The Article also has argued that
247. Lind, supra note 1, at 378.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 383; see also BOBBITr, supra note 1, at 28. Bobbitt states that "judicial
review that is wicked, but follows the forms of argument, is legitimately done; and review
that is benign in its design and ameliorative in its result but which proceeds arbitrarily or
according to forms unrecognized within our legal culture, is illegitimate." BOBBITT, supra
note 1, at 28.
251. Lind, supra note 1, at 389.
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the current Wittgensteinian project in law should be rejected because
legal propositions seem to require more of a justification than that
they are derived from some internal modality, and the new Wittgen-
steinians' view of truth is unacceptable. In addition, the Article has
contended that the Wittgensteinian internalist project should be
rejected because inquiry into judicial practice reveals that adjudicatory
practice is sometimes externalist. Courts sometimes appear to justify
their decisions in terms of matters that are external to law as it is
generally understood. Finally, the Article has argued that the new
Wittgensteinian approach to law should be rejected because it seems
to be a type of formalism.
In rejecting the Wittgensteinian program in law, this Article is
consistent with philosophy's general repudiation of the Wittgen-
steinian conception of philosophy that has taken place over the last
few decades. 2 As Richard Rorty has explained, philosophers have
generally rejected the Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy in
favor of a return to systematic attempts to solve traditional prob-
lems. 3 Likewise, Michael Dummett has observed that the trouble
with the later Wittgenstein approach is that he cannot supply us with
a foundation for future work in philosophy.' According to Dum-
mett, Wittgenstein gave us no systematic theory of meaning, and
therefore, nothing on which to build. 5
V. CONCLUSION
Recently, a number of commentators have proposed a new
approach to jurisprudence and justification in law which is inspired by
the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The new Wittgen-
steinians suggest that a proposition of law is true if one can show that
one is correctly using the words in question. Therefore, they conclude
that the task of jurisprudence is to describe the forms of argument
used by lawyers to show the truth of propositions in law. This Article
has sought to evaluate this new approach to jurisprudence and legal
justification by, among other things, examining the history of the
Wittgensteinian descriptive project in other areas of philosophy. The
252. RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, supra note 8, at 3; DUMMErr, supra note 10, at 452-
53.
253. RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, supra note 8, at 3.
254. DUMMETr, supra note 10, at 453.
255. Id at 452-53.
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Article concludes that the Wittgensteinian descriptive project in law
should be rejected.
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